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Rationales for Applying CERCLA Retroactively
After Landgraf v. USI Film Products: Overcoming
the Presumption Against Retroactivity
MICHBELLE LEVEQUE*
Since its enactment in 1980, many courts have faced the issue of whether
CERCLA should be applied retroactively to create liability for the creation of
hazardous waste sites occurring long before CERCIA was passed. For several
years, the courts routinely held that CERCIA's text, legislative history, and
overall purpose warranted retroactive application. However, the Supreme
Court's recent rding in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, requiring a clear
expression of congressional intent to overcome the traditional presumption
against retroactivity, has re-opened debate on CERCL.A's retroactivity. At least
one federal court has held, in light of Landgraf, that there is not sufficiently
clear evidence of congressional intent to apply CERCIA retroactively. This
Comment canvasses the history of CERCIA's retroactive application, outlining
the basis for the many pre-Landgraf decisions applying CERCIA retroactively.
The author then thoroughly analyzes Landgraf. The Comment concludes that
CERCLA 's text, legislative history, overall purpose, and congressional silence,
taken together, support continued retroactive application even after Landgraf.
I. INTRODUCTION
From 1964-1973, approximately 16.5 million gallons of concentrated
chemical waste were deposited in an area well known for its sandy soil and
abundant groundwater reserves in Hardeman County, Tennessee. 1 The Velsicol
Chemical Company, the operator of the site, assured local public health
authorities in 1964 that it had only placed "semi-solid non-combustible residue"
in "corrosion-resistant 55-gallon drums" at the site.2 However, the drums soon
began leaking and contamination was evident in the wells of private citizens.3
The company's actions did not violate state law in 1964, but nonetheless have
since created significant harm to the present environment.4
In 1980, Congress addressed the problem of old or abandoned hazardous
waste sites, like the Velsicol site, through the Comprehensive Environmental
* The author would like to thank her family: Dan, Rose, Mark, and Brian for their
patience and support
I See CRAiG E. COLTEN & PMm N. SKINNER, TH ROAD TO LoVE CANAL: MANAGING
bDUrrRiAL WASE BEFoREEPA 156-57 (1996).
2 See id.
3 See id.
4 See id. There was ultimately a multimillion dollar judgment against Velsicol. See
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
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Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).5 CERCLA imposes
liability on Potentially Responsible Persons (PRP's),6 such as Velsicol
Chemical, for damage caused by a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance into the environment.7 When an action is brought under CERCLA's
liability scheme, usually under CERCLA section 107, courts customarily apply
the statute to impose strict, joint and several, and retroactive liability on PRP's.8
5 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). In general, CERCLA provides for funding and enforcement
authority for cleaning up thousands of hazardous waste sites in the United States. See J.
GORDON ARBUCKLE ET At., ENViRONMENTAL LAw HANDBOOK (11th ed. 1991). CERCLA
also directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to list at least 400 sites on the
National Priorities List for prioritized long-term remedial evaluation and response. See
VALERm M. FOGLEMAN, HAZARDOUS WAST CIEANUP, L ABuTY, AND LmGATION 36
(1992). CERCLA also created "Superfund," a multibillion dollar cleanup fund that the U.S.
EPA is authorized to use to investigate, abate, and clean up hazards created by abandoned
contaminated sites. See id. at 1.
6 CERCLA section 107(a) provides liability for:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity,
at any faciity ... and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened released which causes the incurrence of response
costs ....
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C § 9607(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
7 PRP's can be held liable for various types of damages: (1) response costs incurred by
EPA, (2) response costs incurred by private persons, (3) natural resource damages, (4) health
assessment or health effects study costs. See AMmECAN BAR AsSOCIATiON YOUNG LAWYERs
DivsION, CERCLA PRudmn 1 (Susan K. Wiens & Lisa S. Keyes eds., 1995).
8 CERCLA's text does not expressly address whether liability is strict, joint and several,
and retroactive, but courts have nonetheless held that it does apply strictly, joint and severally,
and retroactively. See O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 182 n.9 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding that
CERCLA liability is strict); Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1989)
(finding that CERCLA imposes strict liability), United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160
(4th Cir. 1988) (finding that CERCLA retroactively imposes strict, joint and several liability);
United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726, 734 (8th
Cir. 1986) (finding that CERCLA operates retroactively in situations in which past acts have
contributed to existing endangerment); Continental Title Co. v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke
Co., 959 F. Supp. 893, 895 (N.D. I. 1997) (finding that Olin is not persuasive and that
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Currently, there has been debate on the retroactivity of CERCLA9-whether a
party whose conduct was completely legal prior to CERCLA's enactment in
1980, such as Velsicol Chemical's conduct in 1964, can now be civilly liable
under CERCLA for damages. 10
CERCLA does not speak directly to the issue of retroactive liability in its
text. Moreover, because CERCLA was hastily passed by Congress in
December 1980 during a lame duck session, 11 the scant legislative history
provides little or no indication of congressional intent. 12 Thus, the courts have
CERCLA applies retroactively); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Service, 933 F. Supp.
431 (M.D. Penn. 1996); Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651,
664 (N.D. Ind. 1996) ("Tllhere is clear evidence that by enacting CERCLA Congress
intended to hold parties responsible for the cleanup of releases that they caused or to which
they contributed, even if the releases took place prior to the date CERCLA was enacted.");
Nevada cc rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691, 695 (D. Nev. 1996)
("Tlhe clear intent of Congress was to provide for retroactive application of the CERCLA
liability provisions."); Hillsborough County v. A & e Road Oiling Service Inc., 877 F. Supp.
618, 621 (M.D. Fla. 1995) ("CERCLA's intent is to be both remedial and retroactive in
nature."); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, Ltd., 875 F. Supp. 1545, 1552
(S.D. Ala. 1995) (holding that responsibility for cleaning up hazardous cites should be placed
on "those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of the chemical poison" (quoting
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990));
Mayor of Town of Boonton v. Drew Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 669 (D.N.J. 1985) ("I
have concluded that pre-CERCLA response costs are recoverable and that they may be
recovered by the plaintiff herein .... ").
9 'Me issue of retroactivity had been settled for quite a while. However, with the recent
ruling in United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), the debate has
again centered on whether CERCLA should truly be retroactive. For a more thorough
discussion of Olin, see infra Part II.C. See also George Clemon Freeman Jr., A Public Policy
Essay: Superfid Retroactivity Revisited, 50 Bus. LAw. 663, 664 (1995) (arguing for the
repeal of retroactive application of CERCLA because of the decision in Landgraf v. U.S.I.
Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)).
10 Liability imposed upon a party for conduct that was legal at the time is retroactive
liability. A classic definition of retroactive application appears in Ohio er rel. Brown v.
Georgeoff, 662 F. Supp. 1300, 1303 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (citing Society for Propagating the
Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156)), where Justice
Story defined retroactive application as one which, "[c]reates a new obligation, imposes a
new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions of considerations already
past...." The Supreme Court has also addressed what is meant by retroactive liability.
"Mhe court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events
completed before its enactment." LandgraJf, 511 U.S. at 269-70 (1994). CERCLA does apply
retroactively-it attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment,
and imposes a new duty with respect to transactions that happened in the past by holding
parties liable for conduct that was entirely legal at the time.
11 See FoGLELAN, supra note 5, at 5.
12 See id. at 21 n.4 (citing Artesian Water Co. v. Government of New Castle County,
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been left to interpret CERCLA's language, and many have found the statute to
apply retroactively. During the mid-1980s courts had determined that CERCLA
did apply retroactively. 13 For more than a decade courts followed the rationale
of decisions like United States v. Shell Oil14 and Ohio v. Georgeoff,'5 which
applied CERCLA retroactively. However, with the Supreme Court's 1994
ruling in Landgraf v. USI Film Products16 the retroactive application of
CERCLA has once again come into question.' 7 In Landgraf the Court ruled
that there is a presumption against retroactive application of a statute that can
only be overcome by clear evidence of congressional intent.18 Since Landgraf,
some commentators and the district court decision in United States v. Olin'9
have suggested that there is not "clear congressional intent" to overcome the
851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) ("CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision. It has
been criticized frequently for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to its
precipitous passage.")); Mid Valley Bank v. North Valley Bank, 764 F. Supp. 1377, 1387
(E.D. Cal. 1991) (calling CERCLA an "extraordinarily poorly drafted statute"); In re
Acushent River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 716 F. Supp. 676, 681 n.6 (D. Mass.
1989) ("Like many a court before it, this Court cannot forbear remarking on the difficulty of
being left compassless on the trackless wastes of CERCLA. This Court has previously noted
the statute's incomprehensible nature.").
There is no House, Senate or conference report on the bill that actually became
CERCLA. In fact, during the House debates, Representatives identified over forty drafting
errors on the bill which became CERCLA. See 126 CONG. Rnc. 31,969 (1980) (remarks of
Rep. Broyhill); id. at 31,975 (remarks of Rep. Synder); see also Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 569-71 (1977) (discussing the problems associated with construing
hastily drafted statutes).
13 See NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 732-33 ("[Uit is manifestly clear that Congress intended
CERCLA to have retroactive effect."); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064,
1079 (D. Colo. 1985) ("[The whole purpose and scheme of CERCLA is retrospective and
remedial."); Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1313-14 (concluding "[tihat the Congressional intent
to make industry pay for the clean up costs must be interpreted as an intent to authorize
lawsuits which impose liability retroactively upon transporters"). Even now in the 1990s most
courts have resolved the fact that CERCLA applies retroactively. See, e.g., Nevada er rel.
Dep't of Transp., 925 F. Supp. at 700 ("This Court does not agree however that Landgraf
undermines NEPACCO's and Shell Oil's textual analysis of CERCLA.").
14 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
15 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
16 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
17 See John R. Jacus & Jan G. Laitos, May CERCLA Apply Retroactively, CoLO. LAW.,
Oct. 25, 1996 at 103 (1996) (briefly discussing the questions that have now arisen because of
Landgrafs effect on CERCLA's liability scheme).
18 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994). For a complete discussion of
Landgraf, see infra Part II.B.
19 921 F. Supp. 1502 (D. Ala. 1996), overrmled by United States v. Olin Corp., 107
F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
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presumption against retroactivity20, thus finding CERCLA cannot be applied
retroactively. 21
This Comment explores the evidence of congressional intent, reflected in
CERCLA's text, legislative history, and policy objectives, to overcome the
presumption against retroactive application of a statute mandated by
Landgraf.22 Part II focuses on the background of CERCLA's retroactivity,
beginning with the first cases to hold CERCLA retroactive. It then explains the
Supreme Court's decision in Landgraf, and closes with a discussion of the
recently decided district court decision in the Olin case. Part Ell examines the
reasons for retroactive application of CERCLA, explaining how the text,
legislative history, the overall congressional purpose, and congressional silence
all function as evidence of Congress's intent that CERCLA applies
retroactively. Part IV shows why the presumption against retroactivity in
Landgraf does not require CERCLA to be applied only prospectively.
20 "Yet Judge Hand's opinion on retroactivity, while standing in isolation, is legally
well-reasoned and provides ample basis for the l1th Circuit to upset the Superfund applecart,
if it is so inclined." Mark D. Tucker, "Retroactive Liability" Is Challenged, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
14, 1996, at C23; see also Supeiwid: Current Owners Could Foot CERCLA Bill if Olin
Decision Holds Up, Panelist Asserts, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA) at D-7 (Sept. 25, 1996)
(discussing Panelist Bernstein's argument that the district court's decision in Olin is correct
because "the legislative history is a mess" and "no congressional intent to provide for
retroactive application could be found in that record."); Justice Department, GOP
Congressman Disagree on Impact of Superfud Riding, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA) at D-6 (May
29, 1996) (discussing Olin controversy and citing George Baker, executive director of the
business-based coalition, Superfund Reform '95, as stating that the court's ruling "is bound to
be replicated in court cases across the country as innocent parties rightfully continue to
challenge EPA's efforts to punish them for perfectly legal conduct"); George Clemon
Freeman Jr., A Pubic Policy Essay: Supefund Retroactivity Revisited, 50 Bus. LAw. 663,
666 (1995) (arguing that Landgrafs presumption against retroactivity applies to CERCLA,
thus limiting CERCLA to only a prospective application).
21 See Olin, 921 F. Supp. at 1502. For a complete discussion of Olin, see infra Part
II.C.
22 The scope of this Comment does not include constitutional challenges to retroactive
application of CERCLA. For a discussion of the constitutional challenges to CERCLA see
FOGOLMAN, supra note 5, at 240; see also ALLAN TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND
LAw AND PRocEDrm § 2.1 (1992). This Comment will not discuss the retroactivity of pre-
enactment costs-those costs incurred by the government for cleaning up a site before
CERCLA was enacted. For a discussion on the retroactive application of response costs, see
James A. Resila, The Retroactive Application of CERCiA: Pre-Enactment Response Costs, 1
FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J., 69, 71 (1989) (determining that because the legislative history is
unclear, CERCLA should not be construed to apply to pre-enactment response costs).
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II. SETTING THE STAGE FOR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
A. Foundational Decisions
Three early decisions extensively analyze CERCLA's retroactive
application: Ohio cc rel. Brown v. Georgeoff,23 United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. (NEPACCO),24 and United States v. Shell Oil
Co.25 All three courts held that CERCLA applies retroactively. 26 These cases
provide the crux of the argument for retroactive application before Landgraf.
Georgeoff was the initial decision to analyze fully whether CERCLA
applies retroactively. First, the Georgeoff court determined that for Ohio to
successfully collect from transporters of hazardous material, CERCLA must be
applied retroactively. 27 The court reasoned that because the transporter's
conduct took place wholly before CERCLA was passed, any imposition of
23 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
24 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
25 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985).
26 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
27 The State of Ohio argued that CERCLA does not have a retroactive effect. See
Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1303 ("Ohio urges the Court to create an exception to this
definition-one which would allow a statute to rely solely upon past acts without finding the
statute to apply retroactively."). The court rejected this argument by comparing liability under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which is based upon continuing harm,
and CERCLA, which bases liability upon acts and events which occurred solely in the past. It
distinguished RCRA from CERCLA citing a RCRA decision:
The Diamond Shamrock decision illustrates an important distinction which
underlines the [c]ourt's analysis of this issue. Because Diamond Shamrock retained
control of the dump after the date of the statute's passage, liability could be premised
upon contimdng to maintain the dump in an improper condition. The Diamond Shamrock
Court did not impose liability for placing the waste at the dump before RCRA's
enactment. It relied solely upon Diamond Shamrock's failure to remove the waste after
RCRA's enactment.
Id. at 1304 (emphasis added).
Some courts find that retroactive application of CERCLA is not required, and instead
find that CERCLA can be applied to make PRP's liable, avoiding the entire question of
retroactivity. See United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal Co., 653 F. Supp.
984 (D.S.C. 1984). "Thus, it is this court's view that CERCLA is not retroactive as applied
in this case. Such a construction avoids a constitutional question and is therefore
preferred .... [E]ven if CERCLA were considered retroactive it would clearly satisfy the




liability under CERCLA would require reading the statute retroactively. 28
After determining that CERCLA does have retroactive effect, the
Georgeoff court addressed whether there was congressional intent to overcome
the presumption against retroactive application of statutes. 29 Turning first to the
textual evidence, the court analyzed the use of past tense verbs such as "accepts
or accepted" and "inactive sites." 30 In arguing for retroactive application, Ohio
as plaintiff relied on the maxim of statutory construction that a statute is to be
construed to give meaning and effect to each of its words. 31 Thus, it contended
that "accepted" must be construed to apply to conduct occurring before its
enactment, otherwise it would be of no effect and violate the maxim. 32 The
court found that although "accepted" could be construed to apply exclusively to
pre-enactment conduct, the statute does not require such an application.33
The Georgeoff court then addressed Ohio's second textual argument-that
because Congress provided for only prospective liability for damages to natural
resources in section 107(t), and did not limit the temporal reach of the general
liability provision, section 107(a), the general liability provision can be applied
both retroactively and prospectively. 34 In other words, because Congress was
explicit in defining section 107(t) to be prospective and was silent in section
107(a), the court can draw a negative inference that Congress intended section
107(a) to be both prospective and retroactive.35 From the text of the statute-
28 See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1304.
29 See id. at 1308-09. In determining whether there was clear congressional intent the
court applied a step-by-step analysis, beginning with the text of the statute. "The [c]ourt's
analysis must begin with the fundamental rule of law that the intent of a statute is to be sought
first in the language in which it is framed. If that language is plain and unambiguous, then
there is no need to enlist the rules of interpretation... ." Id. (quoting Windsor v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 509 F. Supp. 342, 344 (D.D.C. 1981)).
30 See id. at 1310; see also supra note 6 for text of CERCLA section 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
9607(a)(1994).
31 See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1309-10.
32 See id.
33 See id. Although the court was uncomfortable in construing "accepted" to apply only
prospectively, it stated the possibility that "accepted" could be read in such a way as not to
imply retroactivity: "TIhe act of accepting hazardous wastes will have always taken place
before the occurrence of a release which causes the incurrence of response costs. Transporters
who acted after enactment of CERCLA will be held liable as having 'accepted' hazardous
wastes." Id.
34 See id. at 1311. "[The § 9607(t) prohibition on recovery for injuries to natural
resources occurring before CERCLA's enactment suggests, by implication, that a similar
prohibition does not apply to other response costs." Id.
35 See id. at 1309-11. The negative inference that retroactive application of one section
of a statute, because other sections are expressly limited to apply prospectively, is specifically
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the past tense verbs and the negative inference-the Georgeoff court found that
these "provisions provide some evidence that Congress intended CERCLA to
apply retroactively.",36
Finding the text helpful, but not dispositive, the court turned to the
legislative history. 37 The court indicated that remarks made during Senate
debates were strong evidence of the congressional intent to impose liability
upon those who were responsible for dumping in the past. One Senator noted
"the need for an emergency Federal response to deal with abandoned waste
sites and chemical spills is real, and it is immediate." 38 Another Senator
remarked that "we have no time to lose .... I believe the clear consensus is
that we must clean up abandoned hazardous dump sites as soon as
possible. . . . 39 Thus, the court concluded that together both CERCLA's text
and sparse legislative history provided an adequate ground to apply the statute
retroactively.40
Two years after Georgeoff, two other lower courts undertook the analysis
of whether CERCLA applied retroactively. The district court in Shell Oil
agreed with Georgeoff, holding that CERCLA applies retroactively. 41 As in
Georgeoff, the court found that verb tenses were not in themselves dispositive
and that the negative inference argument-that Congress "implicitly authorized
retroactive application of sections 107(a)(4)(A) and (B) by affirmatively limiting
retroactive application of the third category of liability, damages to natural
resources, section 107(a)(4)(C)"-was an additional indication of congressional
intent to apply CERCLA retroactively. 42
The court then undertook a brief analysis of the legislative history. Shell's
principal contention was that because the House bill, as introduced, authorized
recovery for pre-enactment response costs, the fact that the bill was stricken
what the presumption against retroactivity is meant to alleviate. See Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 259 (1994) (finding against petitioners' argument that "[b]ecause
Congress provided specifically for prospectivity in two places... we should infer that it
intended the opposite for the remainder of the statute."); see also United States v. Olin, 927
F. Supp. 1502, 1510 (S.D. Ala. 1996).
36 Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1311 (emphasis added).
37 See id. at 1311. "The [c]ourt, therefore, will consider these statutory terms as indicia,
but not dispositive indicia, of a [c]ongressional intent to allow retroactive application of
CERCLA." Id.
38 126 CONG. REc. 30,940 (1980) (remarks of Senator Tsongas).
39 Id. at 30,945 (1980) (remarks of Senator Danforth).
40 See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1311-12.
41 See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1077 (D. Colo. 1985).
42 See id. at 1076; see also supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
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weighed heavily against retroactive application of CERCLA.43 The court
correctly reasoned that the removal of the retroactivity provision in the previous
bill was not a conscious effort of Congress to delete retroactivity from
CERCLA. Instead, the removal occurred because the language of the House
bill was entirely struck and replaced completely with Senate Bill 1480.44 The
court weighed the textual evidence, legislative history, and general purpose and
scheme of CERCLA together, ultimately concluding that "the whole purpose
and scheme of CERCLA is retrospective and remedial... [and] CERCLA
authorizes recovery of pre-enactment response costs." 45
In 1986, the Eighth Circuit became the first circuit court to face the
question of whether CERCLA applies retroactively. 46 In its decision, the
NEPACCO court, citing Shell Oil, found that CERCLA evidences a "clear
congressional intent" to overcome the presumption against retroactivity. First,
the court found the past tense of verbs-such as the encompassing nature of
"owned or operated," "arranged," and "accepted"-were again not in
themselves dispositive, but taken cumulatively provided evidence of
retroactivity. 47 Second, it found the statutory scheme to be overwhelmingly
remedial and retroactive, thus finding that for CERCLA to be effective it must
reach past conduct. 48 Finally, the court confirmed this backward looking focus
with the legislative history-the language of Senate Report 1480, and various
other reports. 49 It ultimately found that CERCLA applied retroactively and held
that pre-enactment response costs-costs incurred by the government to clean
up the site before CERCLA was enacted-were recoverable from responsible
43 See Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1077.
44 See id. "I decline to draw from this deletion the conclusion Shell urges. Although the
House did pass H.R. 7020, it did not become law. The version finally adopted by the House
and enacted by Congress as a whole, amounted to a wholesale deletion of H.R. 7020 and
substitution of S. 1480, the Senate Bill." id.
45 Id. at 1079.
46 See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726
(8th Cir. 1985).
47 See id. at 733.
48 See id. "Further, the statutory scheme itself is overwhelmingly remedial and
retroactive. CERCLA authorizes the EPA to force responsible parties to clean up inactive or
abandoned hazardous substance sites." Id.
49 See id. at 733-37. "Congress intended CERCLA 'to initiate and establish a
comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems
associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.'" Id. at 733 (quoting
Environmental Responses Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.
2767) 6125).
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parties. 50
These foundation cases hold that imposing liability for past conduct, which
was legal at the time, requires a retroactive reading of CERCLA, thus
triggering the presumption against retroactivity. They all agreed that there is
"clear congressional intent" evidenced in the text, legislative history, and the
purpose and scheme of CERCLA, to find that Congress intended CERCLA to
apply to pre-enactment conduct.
B. Landgraf's Presumption Against Retroactivity
The Supreme Court's opinion in LandgraS1 is the Court's most recent
directive on applying the presumption against retroactivity of statutes. In
Landgraf, the Court decided that section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
should not be applied retroactively, finding "no clear evidence of congressional
intent" that section 102 should apply to cases arising before its enactment.52
The Court's first task was to "determine whether Congress ha[d] expressly
prescribed the statute's proper reach .... [W]hether the new statute would
have retroactive effect. . . . 53 Because Congress did not expressly provide for
the temporal reach of the statute, the Court turned to its second task-
determining whether there was "clear congressional intent" to overcome the
presumption against retroactivity. 54
In trying to extract "clear congressional intent," the Court turned first to
the text of the statute. However, the court found the text itself did not evidence
a "clear Congressional intent." 55 In addition, the Court did not find negative
inferences within the statute persuasive. 56 The petitioners, relying on the canon
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius,"57 had argued that "because Congress
50 See id. at 734-37.
51 Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994).
52 See id. at 286. The Court made a distinction between a "clear statement" of
congressional intent and a "clear expression" of congressional intent. The latter is what the
Court requires. See id. at 284, 286.
53 Id. at 280 (emphasis added). The Court determined that a statute has a "retroactive
effect" if it: "[l]mpair[s] the rights a party possessed when he acted, increase[s] a party's
liability for past conduct, or impose[s] new duties with respect to transactions already
completed." Id.
54 See id. It is notable that the Court did not prescribe that there must be a "clear
statement" of congressional intent, only that there be "clear congressional intent" to apply the
statute retroactively. The Court did not explicitly define what constitutes "intent." See id.
55 See id. at 283.
56 See id. at 259.
57 'Me canon of statutory interpretation means "that the expression of one thing is the
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provided specifically for prospectivity in two places, Section 109(c) and Section
402(b), [the Court] should infer that it intended the opposite for the remainder
of the statute."58 The Court rejected the argument. First, the Court reasoned
that Congress knew how to provide for retroactivity if it wanted to, as it did
apply Title VII's damages provision in the 1990 legislation to cases currently
pending. 59 Next, the Court noted that these sections were "[c]omparatively
minor and narrow provisions in a long and complex statute. " 60 Thus, the Court
concluded, "given the high stakes of the retroactivity question, the broad
coverage of the statute, and the prominent and specific retroactivity provisions
in the 1990 bill, it would be surprising for Congress to have chosen to resolve
that question through negative inferences drawn from two provisions of quite
limited effect."61
The legislative history also lacked evidence of a congressional intent to
apply the statute retroactively. First, there was a failed attempt to override a
presidential veto of a similar bill that would have included retroactivity.62 The
Court found that the veto and failed override provided proof that Congress
faced the retroactivity issue and deleted retroactive language as part of a
compromise that made passage of the Act possible. 63 Furthermore, the
legislative history indicated a lack of congressional will to apply the act
exclusion of another." See BLACK'S LAw DIcIoNARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
5 8 Laidgraf, 511 U.S. at 259.
59 See id. at 259-61.
60Id. at 258.
611d. at 259.
62 See id. at 255-56. The veto incident arose under the following scenario:
In 1990, a comprehensive civil rights bill passed both Houses of Congress.
Although similar to the 1991 Act in many other respects, the 1990 bill differed in that it
contained language expressly calling for retroactive application of many of its provisions,
including the section providing for damages in cases of intentional employment
discrimination. The President vetoed the 1990 legislation, however, citing the bill's
"unfair retroactivity rules" as one reason for his disapproval. Congress narrowly failed
to override the veto.
Id.
63 See id. at 259.
The absence of comparable language in the 1991 Act cannot realistically be attributed to
oversight or to unawareness of the retroactivity issue. Rather, it seems likely that one of
the compromises that made it possible to enact the 1991 version was an agreement not to
include the kind of explicit retroactivity command found in the 1990 bill.
Id. at 256.
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retroactively, suggesting that Congress "agreed to disagree" about whether the
act would apply to pre-enactment conduct.64
Section 102 also contained an authorization of punitive damages, a criminal
type of sanction. 65 Because of the danger in imposing a criminal sanction
retroactively, the Court found a possible constitutional ex post facto clause
problem. 66 The Court stated that even if retroactive application of a new statute
would vindicate its purpose more fully, it is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption against retroactivity.67 Through its extensive examination of both
text and legislative history, the Court found an absence of a clear congressional
intent to overcome the presumption against retroactivity. However, the Court
not only considered the text and legislative history, but also took note of the
"purpose" argument-"that retroactive application of a new statute [might]
vindicate its purpose morefully. ''68 However, in the context of the Civil Rights
Act, the Landgraf Court found that the purpose argument was "not sufficient to
rebut the presumption against retroactivity." 69 In the case of CERCLA,
however, the purpose argument complements the legislative history and text to
rebut the presumption against retroactivity. In light of the Landgraf decision,
the stability of CERCLA's "well-settled" retroactive application becomes
shaken.
64 See id. at 263. "The history reveals no evidence that Members believed that an
agreement had been tacitly struck on the controversial retroactivity issue, and little to suggest
that Congress understood or intended the interplay of §§ 402(a), 402(b), and 109(c) to have
the decisive effect petitioner assigns them." Id. at 262-63.65 See id. at 281. As the Court correctly stated, punitive damages connote a type of
criminal character and the imposition of punitive damages for conduct that was legal at the
time, but is now illegal, creates a possible Ex Post Facto clause problem. See U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 9, cl. 3 "The very labels given 'punitive' or 'exemplary' damages, as well as the
rationales that support them, demonstrate that they share key characteristics of criminal
sanctions." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 281.
66 See id. at 281. Ex post facto laws are laws which provide a punishment for an act that
was legal at the time it was committed. See BLACK's LAw DIcnoNARY 580 (6th ed. 1990).
Constitutional challenges to the retroactivity of CERCLA are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
67 See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 285-86. Notably, the Court also stated, "Section 102 is
plainly not the sort of provision that must be understood to operate retroactively because a
contrary reading would render it ineffective." Id. at 286.




C. United States v. Olin Corp.70
In Olin, Judge Hand of the Southern District Court of Alabama broke with
precedent, holding that CERCLA does not apply retroactively in light of the
recent decision in Landgraf71 The court first set out its interpretation of the
Landgraf test,72 and like Georgeoff, Shell Oil, and NEPACCO found that
CERCLA contains no language explicitly stating its temporal reach.73
The lower court then turned to CERCLA's legislative history. It mainly
ignored the congressional debates and reports, curtly concluding that because of
an absence of a clear indication of congressional intent in the legislative history,
CERCLA does not apply retroactively. 74 The court took special note that there
was no conference report and that much of the legislative history comes from
"bills introduced which contributed to some extent to the final act. "'75 The court
read CERCLA's legislative history narrowly, reasoning that because the precise
issue of retroactivity was not addressed in the debates, including debate on prior
bills, any attempt to override the presumption against retroactivity in Landgraf
was "nearly fatal." 76 When the court did not find a clear statement of
70 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), overnded by United States v. Olin Corp., 107
F.3d 1506 (1lth Cir. 1997).
71 See id. at 1502.
72 See id. at 1511. The court set out the test as follows:
1) to determine a) whether Congress has expressly stated the statue's reach and b) if not,
whether the text and legislative history have "clearly prescribed" Congress'[s] intent to
apply the provision retroactively; 2) if not, to determine whether the provision actually
has "retroactive effect on the party" . . . . 3) if so, to apply the traditional presumption
against retroactivity-absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary.
Id.
73 See id. at 1513. The court did not perform an independent textual analysis, but rather
relied heavily upon the decisions in Georgeoff, NEPACCO, and Shell Oil.
Georgeoffls and Shell Oil's conclusion that the statutory language in CERCLA is not
sufficient to establish retroactivity is persuasive. Although NEPACCO arguably reaches
a contrary conclusion, it does so without conducting nearly as extensive an analysis as
done in Georgeoff. This court concludes, therefore, that the language of section 107
provides "no clear evidence of Congressional intent," as required by Landgraf.
Id. at 1513.
74 See id. at 1515-16.
75 Id. at 1514 (quoting FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
§ 4A.02[2][a], at 4A-51).
76 See id.; see also Part ffl.B of this Comment for a comprehensive analysis of the
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congressional intent to apply CERCLA retroactively, it concluded that there
was simply a lack of evidence of congressional intent.77 Because the court took
such a narrow view of the history and the text, searching for some magically
clear indication by Congress, it failed to see that the text, history, and general
spirit of the act, taken together, provide clear evidence of a congressional intent
to apply CERCLA retroactively. Finding that the presumption against
retroactivity applies, but discovering no evidence of congressional intent to
overcome the presumption, the court concluded section 107(a) and section
106(a) do not apply retroactively.78
The district court was later overturned by the United States court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 79 The court first noted the immense body of
law which has found that CERCLA applies retroactively. It also noted that
CERCLA was tvice reauthorized, once with substantive changes, without
suggesting that the courts had misconstrued the statute regarding retroactivity. 80
The court then undertook an independent analysis of CERCLA, beginning with
the text. It noted that CERCLA was to reach "any person who at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated" a facility. 81 Thus, the
court reasoned that Congress wanted to target both current and former owners
and operators of contaminated sites. 82
The court went on to discuss the purpose and legislative history of
CERCLA. It found that the purpose of CERCLA supports retroactive
application, reasoning that "an essential purpose of CERCLA is to place the
ultimate responsibility for the clean up of hazardous waste on 'those responsible
for problems caused by the disposal of chemical poison,'" 83 the court found
legislative history relating to the retroactivity of CERCLA.
77 See id. at 1516.
78 See id. at 1516-19.
79 See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
80 See id. (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388 and Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
49, 100 Stat. 1613).
81 See id. at 1513.
82 This argument is fairly weak. By including this language it could be argued that
Congress sought to reach only "future former owners and operators," i.e., persons who
would become former owners and operators after December 11, 1980, CERCLA's effective
date.
83 Olin, 107 F.3d at 1514 (quoting Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts., 94 F.3d
1489, 1501-02 (11th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted)). "Congress's twin goals of
cleaning up pollution that occurred prior to December 11, 1980, and of assigning
responsibility to culpable parties can be achieved only through retroactive application of
CERCLA's response cost liability provisions; this fact provides additional evidence of clear
congressional intent favoring retroactivity." Id.
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that the purpose of CERCLA supports retroactive application. In assessing the
legislative history, the court noted that while there was not an express statement
regarding retroactivity, "all those commenting on [it and the parallel House bill]
expressed the belief that the bills would apply retroactively to those responsible
for the releases in existing waste sites." 84 Through an analysis of the statute's
purpose, legislative history, and text, it concluded that there is clear
congressional intent favoring retroactive application of CERCLA. 85
Although Judge Hand's district court opinion was overruled by the
Eleventh Circuit, his opinion raises important questions regarding the stability
of CERCLA's retroactive scheme. 86 With no express mandate by Congress, the
door is now open for courts and commentators to question CERCLA's
retroactive application in light of the Landgraf decision.
III. OVERCOMING THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROACTIVITY
A. CERCLA's Tet
Any attempt to determine whether Congress specified a "clear
congressional intent" to apply CERCLA retroactively must begin with the text
of the statute itself.87 The text of CERCLA is not in itself dispositive, yet it
shows a uniform scheme to make polluters pay, even if the harm occurred in
the past. The Georgeoff court recognized this through the use of verb tenses in
CERCLA section 107(a),8 8 which includes both present and past tense verbs. 89
84 Id. at 1514 (quoting Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp.
651, 662 (N.D. Ind. 1996). The court also declined to disregard any legislative history simply
because Congress passed a compromise bill.
85 See id. at 1515.
86 Judge Hand's decision in Olin took a very narrow view of both what Landgraf
requires as "clear congressional intent" and CERCLA's text and legislative history.
"Evidence of clear congressional intent" should not be limited to a clear "statement" in the
text and legislative history. In fact, "three justices objected to Landgraf because the majority
adopted a 'clear intent' standard rather than a 'clear statement' requirement." Olin, 107 F.3d
at 1513 n.16 (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 287 (1994) (Scalia, J.
concurring). Regardless, there are many indications both in the text and legislative history that
provide clear evidence that Congress intended for CERCLA to apply retroactively. See infra
Parts I.A and B.
87 Note that Lmdgraf does not require that there be a clear "statement," only clear
"evidence." See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 286-87 (objecting to the majority's failure to
announce a "clear statement rule" against statutory retroactivity, which could only be rebutted
by an express command in the statutory text) (Scalia, J., concurring).
88 See Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1310-11 (N.D. Ohio
1983).
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That section reads: "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport" is liable as a PRP. 90 The court recognized that the
word "accepted" may apply to pre-enactment conduct, but the statute does not
require such application. However, the court noted that such a construction
would render the word "accepts" virtually meaningless. 91 The NEPACCO
court also recognized that phrases such as: "any person who... arranged with
a transporter for transport for disposal"92 and "any person who at the time of
disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility .... 93
evidenced the intent to impose liability on past actions that occurred before
CERCLA was enacted. 94 Even though not dispositive in itself, this language at
the very least raises a suggestion of liability for past conduct. The use of both
verb tenses in the statute could be a mere drafting oversight, but it is more
likely that Congress included both verb tenses deliberately because it anticipated
that the majority of CERCLA suits would be for conduct that happened in the
past.
A further textual argument made in both Georgeoff and Shell Oil employed
the use of a negative inference. Both courts supported the view that because
section 107(t) of CERCLA expressly states that damages to natural resources
should only be applied prospectively, Congress implicitly authorized retroactive
application of section 107(a) by affirmatively limiting only section 107(f) to
prospective damages. 95 The Court in Landgraf specifically rejected this
89 See id. at 1310.
90 CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994) (emphasis added).
91 See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1310. The court went on to explain that:
At most, "accepts" will apply to transporters who accept hazardous substances for
transport to facilities from which a release is presently occurring. While the [c]ourt is
uncomfortable with this result, given the problems presented by the other proposed
constructions of the words "accepts or accepted," the [c]ourt concludes that this is the
most reasonable construction.
Id. at 1310 n.12.
92 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
93 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (emphasis added).
94 See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726,
733 (8th Cir. 1986).
95 See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1075-76 (D. Colo. 1985). "I
conclude that Congress implicitly authorized retroactive application of sections 107(a)(4)(A)
and (B) by affirmatively limiting retroactive application of the third category of liability,
damages to natural resources, section 107(a)(4)(C)." Id. at 1076; see also Georgeoff, 562 F.
Supp. at 1311 ("Finally the § 9607(f) prohibition on recovery for injuries to natural resources
occurring before CERCLA's enactment suggests, by implication, that a similar prohibition
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argument, which is based on the expressio unius est exlusio alterius maxim.
The Court found that because Congress specifically provided for prospectivity
in two places, the Court should not automatically infer that it intended the
opposite for the remainder of the statute. 96 The Court stated, "[g]iven the high
stakes of the retroactivity question, the broad coverage of the statute, and the
prominent and specific retroactivity provisions in the 1990 bill, it would be
surprising for Congress to have chosen to resolve that question through
negative inferences drawn from two provisions of quite limited effect. "97
Similarly, the natural resources provision in CERCLA, which is purely
prospective, does not allow the inference of retroactivity in the remainder of the
liability scheme. Although the negative inference argument is stronger in the
case of CERCLA, it is not wholly persuasive in light of Landgraf. Unlike the
two minor and remotely situated prospective provisions in the Civil Rights Act,
section 107(t) of CERCLA is of greater consequence and closely related to the
general liability provision of section 107(a). However, this negative implication
is not conclusive proof of congressional intent. Therefore, the next step in the
analysis is to examine congressional intent via legislative history.
B. Legislative History
In examining CERLCA's legislative history, it is important to review it
within the overall context of its enactment. Congress was rushed to pass
hazardous waste legislation before the end of the session.98 There is no House,
Senate, or conference report to explain the actions of the members of Congress
who reached the compromise that eventually became CERCLA. 99
does not apply to other response costs.").
96 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 259 (1994); United States v. Olin,
927 F. Supp. 1502, 1509 (S.D. Ala. 1996). But see Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v.
Fiberbond Corp., 946 F. Supp. 651, 658 (N.D. Ind. 1996) ("[The distinction between
natural resource damages and other response costs was implicit evidence that Congress
intended liability for response costs to apply retroactively."); Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp.
v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691, 694 (D. Nev. 1996) ("[Tihe negative implication analysis
... is far more persuasive in the CERCLA context than it was in the Landgraf case."); Nova
Chemicals, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1098 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) ("Although a similar
negative inference argument was rejected in Landgraf, the facts of Landgra are
distinguishable.").
97 Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 259; See also supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
98 See Letter from Sen. Stafford and Sen. Randolph to Rep. Florio (Dec. 2, 1980),
reprinted in 1 SENATE CoMMrr=s ON ENviRONmENT AND PuBUiC WORKS, A LEGILAnVE
HISTORY OF THE COM1RENSIVE ENvIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND
LIkABrY AcrOF 1980 at 774 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter HISrORY].
99 See FOGLEMAN, supra note 5, at 5. There were prior reports in the House and the
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The two bills that originally proceeded through the House and Senate were
H.R. 7020 and S. 1480, respectively. S. 1480 became the enacted version
when Congress voted to strike the language of H.R. 7020 and replace it with S.
1480.100 H.R. 7020 was originally introduced with a retroactivity provision,
which was later deleted.' 0 ' Under a cursory examination this would appear to
support the argument that the provision does not apply retroactively because
Congress explicitly took it out, meaning they wanted liability to be only
prospective. However, in the context of CERCLA's enactment, and in light of
the scheme of the Act, this deletion's effect is minimal because the final version
passed by the House "amounted to a wholesale deletion of H.R. 7020 and
substitution of S. 1480."102
The reports of the House and Senate on the early versions of the bill do not
address the issue of retroactivity squarely, but House Report 1016103 gives
some guidance. First, the report mentions the infamous Love Canal.104 This
Senate, but no reports after the bill was revised behind closed doors in late December 1980.
See id. at 5-30.
100 See Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1077.
101 The deletion of the provision was not an explicit omission, rather it was a total
rejection of the House bill, with the Senate substituting its bill for the House bill. See
HSTORY, supra note 98, at 771. "Because S. 1480 contained revenue provisions, and
therefore, had to originate in the House, the Senate struck all language after H.R. 7020's
enacting clause and substituted S. 1480." FOGLEMAN, supra note 5, at 12. Therefore, many
important provisions in the House bill were deleted, including particularly important oil spill
provisions. See id. The deletion is also trivial because some believed the Senate bill imposed
broader and much more encompassing liability (including retroactive liability) than the House
bill, proving that even if the retroactive provision in the House was deleted, it was replaced
by an even more broad liability scheme in S. 1480: "The chemical industry supports H.R.
7020 as it was reported by the House .... We oppose S. 1480 which is a legislative disaster.
It's too broad. It tries to punish the chemical industry. It sets up a revolutionary federal toxic
tort liability scheme for past actions which were perfectly legal at the time .. . ." HisToRY,
supra note 98, at 237 (testimony on behalf of the Chemical Manufacturers Association given
by Dr. Louis Fernandez, Vice Chairman of Monsanto Co., before the Finance Committee on
Sept. 11, 1980) (emphasis added). Thus, the elimination of the retroactive provision in the
House bill is meaningless.
102 Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1077. The Shell Oil opinion also discusses an
additional section which was included in the Senate bill but later deleted, section 4(n), which
limited recovery for pre-enactment damages recoverable under section 4(a)(2). However,
section 4(n)(1) did not apply to section 4(a)(1), which provided for response costs. Thus,
given the limited scope of section 4(n), the effect of its deletion is minimal. See id. at 1077-
78.
103 H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt.1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119.
104 See id. at 6121. Love Canal refers to a site in New York which typified corporate
irresponsibility. Hooker Chemical, the owner of the site, damped chemical materials into the
canal. In the 1950s Hooker faced a critical decision-residential developments were
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site typified the problems associated with chemical sites that were sold or
abandoned by companies.' 05 In speaking of the Love Canal problem-sites
which were created before hazardous waste legislation was passed-Congress
expressed its concern as to who will bear the clean up costs associated with
such pre-1980 sites, thus inferring a retroactive application of CERCLA. 10 6
The report also explains that those responsible for the releases should be liable
for clean up costs. 10 7 It definitively states that CERCLA was enacted "to
establish prohibitions and requirements concerning inactive hazardous waste
sites, [and] to provide for liability of persons responsible for releases of
hazardous waste at such sites." 10 8 The House Report provides additional insight
on Congress's purpose of enacting CERCLA-to clean up hazardous sites.
The Senate Report also provides indicia of congressional intent. The report
contains a letter from EPA Administrator Costle to Senator Randolph,
definitively stating that CERCLA makes the polluter pay for past wrongs that
are presently affecting public health and the environment. 10 9 The report also
encroaching and chemical odors required attention. See CoLTEN & SKinm, supra note 1, at
157. Hooker eventually donated the property to the local school board, distancing itself from
the long term management of the hazardous wastes. See id. at 158.
Once filled and transferred, wastes from the Love Canal continued to haunt the
neighbors. Exposure incidents persisted, at least one explosion occurred, and people
complained about chemicals percolating into basement sumps. Eventually, during a
period of elevated precipitation during the late [1970s], the problems with the site took
on proportions that forced the state's health commissioner to issue an emergency health
order that recommended evacuating homes in the area and made the site world-famous.
The great irony of the Love Canal situation, the virtual birthplace of the Supeitnd
legislation and public mistn of hazardous waste disposal sites, was Hooker Electro-
chemical's objective in donating the property ... [as] a means of avoiding liability ....
Id. at 160-61 (emphasis added).
105 Although not specifically mentioned in this report, many other sites were similar to
Love Canal in that they were created long before any hazardous waste legislation was passed.
The problems of all such sites taken together provided the impetus to pass legislation that
would clean up the past evils and make those who were responsible pay. See id. at 161. Other
sites included: a Syracuse, New York site where Allied Chemical and Dye Company and its
predecessors dumped sludge since the 1800s; a Sauget, Illinois site where Monsanto Chemical
Company and others illegally received hazardous wastes and buried them, which resulted in
open pooling of toxic wastes in the floodplain. See id.
106 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 18-21, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6121-22.
107 See id.
108 Id. (emphasis added).
10 9 See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 97-103 (1980). The bill provides for response at
abandoned and inactive sites. See id. at 97. The bill "establish[es] liability for costs expended
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contains the views of Senators Domenici, Bentsen, and Baker: "S.
1480... substantially chang[es] existing common law (in some cases
retroactively)." 1 0 This report provides a stronger tendency to favor
retroactivity, but taken by itself is not dispositive.
The floor debates are more telling of congressional intent in this case. In
the House debates, numerous representatives indicated the need to clean up
abandoned, inactive sites. Remarks included: "[the bill] is designed to clean up
our environment from past improperly disposed of hazardous wastes"; 111
"[tihese are the problems of toxic waste that were disposed of years ago";112
"[the bill deals] with the problem of abandoned waste sites"; 113 and "this bill
attempts to deal with the problems of who pays for cleaning up the
environmental mess we have created." 114 Perhaps the most relevant exchange
occurred between then-Congressman Gore and Congressman Stockman, where
Congressman Stockman stated, "[And once EPA has] found that deep pocket,
they will immediately go to court and sue that deep pocket, and then all the
onus of the law, all the burden will be on him to prove that he was not
responsible for an outcome that occurred thirty years later as a result of this
retroactive liability."11 5 Congressman Stockman's statement shows that even
non-supporters of the House bill understood it to provide for retroactive
liability." 6 The members of the House clearly recognized the importance of
enacting legislation that made the polluters take responsibility. There was even
an economic rationale given for imposing liability upon the past polluters:
[B]y making pollution no-fault, by making it an industrywide problem to the
extent that that moves us away from our effort to seek the guilty party, then we
let the guilty party off the hook. I believe we need an effective bill to trace
those assets to the grave, if necessary, to recover the funds.... But I ask who
benefited from Hooker Chemical's pollution? Did industry benefit? No.
Hooker Chemical benefited. In fact, to the extent that Hooker Chemical
by the government to clean up past disposal practices that today are threatening public health
and the environment." Id. at 98. The liability provisions are not retroactive because "they
merely codify long-standing common law rules relating to liability for hazardous products and
undertakings." Id.
110 Id. at 119.
111 126 CONG. REC. 31,972 (1980) (statement of Rep. Vento) (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 31,973 (statement of Rep. Fisher) (emphasis added).
113 Id. at 31,980 (statement of Rep. LaFalce) (emphasis added).
114 Id. at 31,981 (statement of Rep. Brown) (emphasis added).
115 Ohio cc rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 n.16 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
(quoting 126 CONG. REc. 26,786 (1980) (statement of Rep. Stockman)).
116 Congressman Stockman had even offered an amendment to drastically limit the bill,
but it failed. See FoGLEMAN, supra note 5, at 10.
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polluted and its competitors tried to be responsible, its competitors tried to be
good citizens, they lost.... So I think it is important that we try to move
toward a vehicle which imposes a cost on those who pollute... because If
Hooker Chemical pays and not the whole industy, then Hooker Chemical
cannot pass the cost to the consumer .... 117
Members of the House understood the problems of imposing retroactive
liability. There was clear congressional intent that CERCLA should apply to
sites such as Love Canal, and that Hooker Chemical, the creator of Love
Canal, should be the party responsible for cleaning up. 8
Senators' concerns echoed those of the House: "Our present laws are not
enough .... We must correct those omissions in the law having to do with past
hazardous waste disposal methods." 119 "I believe the clear consensus is that we
must clean up abandoned hazardous dump sites as soon as possible." 120
"Governments must have a toolfor holding liable those who are responsible for
these costs.'121 These debates illustrate that Congress intended for the polluter
to pay, even if it meant imposing retroactive liability. 122 Congress was
cognizant of the problems associated with the clean up of abandoned sites and
realized that Superfund itself would not be sufficient. Hence, Congress intended
that recovery from PRP's would be necessary to implement CERCLA. Without
1 17 HSTORY, supra note 98, at 323 (remarks of Rep. Gramm) (emphasis added). But see
Bruce Howard, Reforming Retroactive and Current Omer Liability Standards in CERCLA to
Increase Fairness and Efficiency, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 325, 332 (1994)
(arguing that retroactive application of CERCLA should be scrapped and replaced with a tax
scheme on insurance companies, business, and the general public).
118 See supra notes 104-117 and accompanying text.
119 125 CONG. REC. 17,995 (1979) (statement of Sen. Muskie introducing S. 1480)
(emphasis added).
120 126 CoNG. Ruc. 30,945 (1980) (statement of Sen. Danforth) (emphasis added).
12 1Id. at 30,971 (statement of Sen. Chaffee) (emphasis added).
122 The views of other senators show that Congress was cognizant of the retroactivity
problem. Senator Moynihan, for example, clearly expressed his views on retroactivity:
However, there are problems with the EPA superfund concept. The draft legislation that
they have come up with... just doesn't deal effectively with the difficult issues. First of
all, it would have no retroactive effect, and so it wouldn't deal with the Love Canal
problem. That, as far as I am concerned, is a sine qua non, a nonnegotiable item.
HISTORY, supra note 98, at 32 (emphasis added).
Congressman LaFalce also succinctly addressed the problem: "It is imperative,
therefore, that the Federal legislation that we enact in the future take cognizance of what New
York State has done... that there be some retroactive effect in the legislation. ... " Id. at 31
(emphasis added).
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imposition of liability on defendants, CERCLA would be rendered ineffective,
because Superfund would eventually run dry. 123 The legislative history shows
that Congress intended for CERCLA to make PRP's fully liable for conduct
that happened in the past which may harm the health and the environment of
the present.
C. Policy and Purposes Behind CERCLA
Finding that both the text and legislative history provide strong indicia of
congressional intent, the next step in the analysis is to examine the overall
legislative scheme and purpose of CERCLA.124 The spirit of CERCLA is
clearly to clean up abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites, such as the
Velsicol Chemical site in Tennessee or the Love Canal site in New York. 125
The question is whether clear congressional intent exists to prove that the means
for accomplishing the cleanup lie with those who are responsible, both before
1980 and after. Four indicators confirm that the spirit of CERCLA is to make
polluters responsible for past wrongs that have harmed today's present health
and environment.
First, the scheme and text of the statute itself show that the spirit of
CERCLA is to make polluters pay. The statute explicitly lists who the
responsible persons are, and this, coupled with the clear congressional intent,
123 Superfund was only intended as a revolving fund (whereby the government can take
funds from the Superfund to pay for initial clean up and then replenish the fund by later
collecting from the responsible parties) rather than a complete account to clean up all
orphaned or abandoned hazardous waste sites. See Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F.
Supp. 1300, 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1983). One commentator notes that "if retroactive liability is
fully eliminated, this will leave an annual shortfall in revenues that has been estimated by the
Congressional Budget Office to be as much as $1.6 billion." Tucker, supra note 19, at C26.
124 In accordance with the "funnel of abstraction," the first inquiry involved the plain
meaning or pure textual analysis, then the analysis turns to legislative intent via the legislative
history. The legislative purpose analysis seeks to determine if the policy and purposes of the
statute support retroactivity. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 353-62 (1990). "The
statutory text is central and commands deference. But to grasp the full reality of its impact we
should see it as part of a flow of policy-making activity." Id. at 359 n.137 (quoting JAMSs
WniEAM HURST, DEAuNG WrrH STATUTES 41 (1982)).
125 It was obvious that the EPA needed additional authority to address what was a
growing problem of abandoned and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. In 1979 and
1980, the passage of proposed legislation was spurred by publicity surrounding the
release of hazardous substances from Love Canal and other uncontrolled or abandoned
sites.
FoGuLAN, supra note 5, at 7. See also supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
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shows that the purpose of CERCLA is to clean up old sites. It makes sense that
in listing certain categories of persons, Congress intended each of them to be
held liable. The scheme of section 107(a), defining responsible parties, shows
that Congress wanted each category of polluters to pay-transporters, past and
present owners and operators, and arrangers. Such a scheme clearly
contemplates that within this group of PRP's, someone must be held
accountable, even if the conduct occurred in the past.
Second, the overall purpose and spirit of CERCLA is reflected throughout
the legislative history. Although the legislative history was not unequivocal in
providing for retroactivity, the purpose of CERCLA that can be gleaned from
the legislative history is that of imposing costs upon those who contributed to
the problem. The Senate Report states:
[S]ociety should not bear the costs of protecting the public from hazards
produced in the past by a generator, transporter, consumer, or dumpsite owner
or operator who has profited or otherwise benefited from commerce involving
these substances and now wishes to be insulated from any continuing
responsibilities for the present hazards to society that have been created.126
Thus, although not crystal clear, the legislative history truly evidences
CERCLA's spirit to hold those who contributed to the problem liable.
Third, it is clear that Congress knew and understood what was involved in
terms of quantity of sites and funds by setting up Superfund only as a revolving
fund for advancing the costs of cleaning up hazardous sites while litigation
progressed, not as a means to pay for the entire clean up effort. 127 The
Georgeoff court cited this apparent lack of sufficient funds in Superfund as an
indicia for retroactive liability:
[C]ongress was aware that the costs of the cleanup it envisioned would greatly
exceed the amount of the Superfund. The legislative history of CERCLA is
replete with references to the scope of the problem which Congress faced.
[Congress] referred to dump sites requiring clean up numbering in the
thousands ....
Obviously, the $1.6 billion Superfund itself will not provide sufficient funds
for the clean up of the existing dump sites without some provision for lawsuits
against private parties .... Assuming arguendo that the cost of the clean up could
be held to $10 billion, 84% of that cost must be recovered from sources other
than the Superfund to complete the job.128
126 S. REp. No. 96-848, at 98 (1980).
127 See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1312-13.
128 Id. at 1313.
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The lack of sufficient funds to clean up the sites that Congress contemplated
shows that one of the purposes of CERCLA was to provide for a recovery of
funds where possible. Thus, Congress created section 107(a) to provide for
clean up of hazardous sites, making those who were responsible for the past
conduct liable for the harm to the health and environment of society today.
Finally, comparing CERCLA to the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA)129 provides additional evidence that the spirit of CERCLA is to
provide for retroactive liability. There is clear congressional intent that RCRA
was to be a forward looking statute. CERCLA was enacted after RCRA to fill
the gaps RCRA left. CERCLA was to look in the opposite direction of
RCRA-backwards. As Representative. Madigan put it:
The Congress provided through the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
a regulatory mechanism to insure the proper disposal of hazardous waste and to
end the negligent practices of the past.
However as many of us... recognized early on, there was definitely a
gap in existing law in dealing with abandoned or "orphan" dump sites.130
If CERCLA is not to apply retroactively to impose liability on PRP's, then
for all practical purposes CERCLA is superfluous because RCRA covers most
liability for prospective dumping. Then-Representative Gore's remarks show
that RCRA was intended to take care of future problems with hazardous wastes,
while CERCLA was to take care of past problems:
There are two major aspects to the problem [of hazardous waste]: First the
prospective dumping, that will occur in the future. Second, dumping that has
already occurred in the past... [IThe prospective dumping will be addressed
in a regulatory program to take effect later this fall pursuant to the
mandate... of RCRA. What we are addressing [in] this legislation is the
dumping that occurred in the past. 131
CERCLA was enacted four years after RCRA, when Congress realized the
deficiencies and shortcomings of the 1976 legislation. 132 The House Report on
CERCLA discusses the problems of RCRA, including the fact that it applies
only prospectively.' 33 Even the Supreme Court acknowledged the differences
129 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1994).
130 126 CONG. REC. 26,340 (1980) (statement of Rep. Madigan).
131 HIORY, supra note 98, at 239. "We are talking about the financial resources
needed to take care of the problems of the past where some companies did a poor job or
whose local jurisdictions had weak laws." Id. (remarks of Rep. Stockman on Sept. 23, 1980).
132 See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt.1, at 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6121.
133 See id. The House report further discusses the problems of RCRA, and that it only
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between RCRA and CERCLA: "Congress thus demonstrated in CERCLA that
it knew how to provide for the recovery of cleanup costs, and that language
used to define the remedies under RCRA does not provide that remedy."1 34
The fact that CERCLA was enacted just two years after RCRA, containing
section 7003, focusing on the abatement of conditions presently threatening
public health and the environment, shows that Congress meant for CERCLA to
be a mechanism, distinct from RCRA, to clean up past sites and recover from
those who were responsible. 135 The hole RCRA left open was for CERCLA to
fill, otherwise Congress could have just amended RCRA's provisions. The
main thrust of CERCLA is to provide a backward looking mechanism to
provide for cleanup of "abandoned" and "inactive" sites. 136 Thus, in light of
the resonating purpose of CERCLA, there is abundant evidence of
congressional intent to overcome the presumption against retroactivity.
D. Congressional Silence
Congress has had ample opportunity, more than a decade, to alter the
retroactive application of CERCLA. 137 Over time many cases have been tried
applies prospectively:
(c) Deficiencies in RCRA have left important regulatory gaps.
(1) The Act is prospective and applies to past sites only to the extent that they are
posing an imminent hazard....
It is the intent of this committee in this legislation to initiate and establish a
comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems
associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.
Id.
134 Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 485 (1996).
135 See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d
726, 738 (8th Cir. 1986). "[RCRA] Section 7003 focuses on the abatement of conditions
threatening health and the environment .... Therefore, it has always reached those persons
who have contributed in the past or are presently contributing to the endangeent... ." Id.
at 740. The Supreme Court also found the differences in liability under RCRA and CERCLA
apparent: "[T]he stark differences between the language of that section [RCRA § 6972] and
the cost recovery provisions of CERCLA... demonstrate that Congress did not intend for a
private citizen to be able to undertake a clean up and then proceed to recover its costs under
RCRA." Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 487.
136 See supra Part IIL.B of this Comment.
137 CERCLA was enacted in 1980 and in 1983 Georgeoff was decided. Ever since the
Georgeoff decision the courts have applied CERCLA retroactively, giving Congress more
than a decade to make modifications if retroactive application was contrary to Congress's
intent.
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and many PRP's held responsible under section 107(a) for events that occurred
in the past, with little or no congressional action to change the retroactive
liability under CERCLA.' 38 Through this inaction Congress has acquiesced,
providing even more evidence of a clear intent that CERCLA must be read
retroactively.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of how to interpret congressional
silence in Bob Jones University v. United States.1 39 In that case, legislation was
introduced to overturn over thirteen IRS rulings over a span of twelve years,
and none ever passed.140 The Court concluded that Congress, by its failure to
take corrective action, had acquiesced in the prior IRS rulings:
Nonaction by Congress is not often a useful guide, but the nonaction here is
significant. During the past 12 years there have been no fewer than 13 bills
introduced to overturn the IRS interpretation of §501(c)(3). Not one of these
bills has emerged from any committee, although Congress has enacted
numerous other amendments to § 501... Congress'[s] failure to act on the
bills proposed on this subject provides added support for concluding that
Congress acquiesced in the IRS rulings of 1970 and 1971.'41
The Court interpreted Congress's inability to change the prior rulings as its
acquiescence, by its failure to modify the IRS rulings.' 42 The Court found
additional support for its opinion in that the prior revenue rulings were
consistent with public policy by granting exemptions to charities. 143
CERCLA can be read analogously. Although bills are periodically
introduced to eliminate retroactive liability, none which would affect CERCLA
have been seriously considered. 144 In 1986, Congress amended and
reauthorized CERCLA via the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA) of 1986.145 CERCLA was reauthorized again in November 1990,
138 See supra notes 8-10.
139 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
140 See id. at 600.
141 Id. at 600-01.
142 See id. at 599.
143 See id. at 597-99.
144 CERCLA was substantially amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA), and Congress has subsequently reauthorized the Superfund
program on November 5, 1990 and September 30, 1991. See FOGLEMAN, supra note 5, at
21; John J. Zodrow, On the Brink of Reform: Four Bills Vie for Supemfid Reauthorization,
ENvmL. SoLurboNs, Dec. 1, 1995, 18 (discussing S. 1285 and H.R. 2256).
14 5 See FOGLamN, supra note 5, at 20. "By 1985, when Congress considered
reauthorizing CERCLA, it realized that the problem of abandoned and uncontrolled
hazardous waste sites was significantly worse than what was foreseen in
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without significant amendments until September 1994.146 Even in 1995 there
were several bills introduced addressing the retroactivity issue, but none were
ever passed. 147 Congress was consciously aware of and had ample opportunity
to examine the retroactive scheme of CERCLA and revise it through any of
CERCLA's amendments. However, Congress has been content with the
imposition of response costs to pre-enactment conduct and instead has
concerned itself with issues such as strengthening the powers of the EPA to
respond to hazardous substance releases and giving it more flexibility to act
through the SARA Amendments. 148 This long period of congressional
acquiescence shows that Congress approves of applying CERCLA
retroactively. 149
1980 .... Therefore, one of the purposes of the [SARA] amendments was to rebuild public
confidence in the Superfund program." Id. at 13-14.
146 See id. at 5 (citing Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980); Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (1986); Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 6301, 104 Stat. 1388, (1990)). Lately the idea
of reforming CERCLA to apply only prospectively has been considered. See H.R. 2500,
104th Cong. (1995):
Sec. 201. RETROACTIVE LIABIL1TY DISCOUNT.
(g) Reimbursement for Retroactive Liability- (1) In the case of a facility or vessel
not owned by the United States listed on the National Priorities List, a person... shall
be eligible for reimbursement from the Fund for 50 percent of the costs referred to in
section 107(a) paid or incurred by such person after October 18, 1995, to the extent
that-
(A) such person's liability under section 107 is attributable to a status or activity of
such person... that existed or occurred prior to January 1, 1987, and
(B) such costs are attributable to response activities carried out after October 18,
1995.
Id.
147 See Zodrow, supra note 145, at 18 (indicating that H.R. 2256, the "Superfund
Liability Equity and Acceleration Act," includes a repeal of pre-1987 retroactive liability and
S. 1285, the "Accelerated Cleanup and Environmental Restoration Act," includes an
exemption from CERCLA liability for any company whose pollution occurred before
December 11, 1980).
148 See FOGLMIAN, supra note 5, at 14.
149 There is a distinction between "congressional acquiescence" and the "presumption
against retroactive application of statute." The presumption against retroactivity must be
overcome, as shown through Landgra4 However, congressional acquiescence is not a
presumption that must be overcome, rather it is one way of extracting congressional intent.
See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (finding that Congress's failure to act in not
subjecting baseball to the same antitrust laws that the majority of other sports are subjected to
is positive inaction by Congress, and proof that they acquiesced, even if it is inconsistent with
the remainder of the statutory scheme).
1998]
OHO STATE LAW JOURNAL
IV. DEPARTING FROM A STRICT READING OFLAmGRAF
A. Distinguishing Landgraf-An Easier Case
An thorough examination of the Landgraf opinion shows the differences
between overcoming the presumption against retroactivity under CERCLA
section 107(a) and the 1991 Civil Rights Act section 102. First, the legislative
history of section 102 indicated that the President had vetoed an earlier version
of the Act on the ground, among others, of perceived unfairness in the bill's
retroactivity provision. 150 The Landgraf Court took special notice that the
omission of the retroactivity provision "was not congressional oversight or
unawareness, but was a compromise that made the Act possible." 151 After
Congress failed to override the President's veto, the 1991 compromise bill was
submitted to the President without the retroactivity language and eventually
passed. 152 Although not dispositive, the veto, the failed attempt to override, and
the ultimate removal of the retroactivity language show that Congress was
certainly aware of the retroactivity issue, and consciously decided to remove the
retroactive language of section 102.153 In contrast, CERCLA contains no such
express or explicit rejection of retroactivity.' 54 It was passed under a hurried
atmosphere and contains no express evidence of congressional awareness such
as a failed override of a presidential veto.
Secondly, the Landgraf Court found it significant that section 102
150 See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 255-56 (1994).
151 Id. at 256.
152 See id. at 256 (citing 136 CONG. REC. S. 16,589 (1990) (66-34 Senate vote in favor
of override)).
153 See id. at 256. The Court recognized that the removal of retroactivity language was
not dispositive in itself:
The absence of comparable language in the 1991 Act cannot realistically be attributed to
oversight or to unawareness of the retroactivity issue. Rather, it seems likely that one of
the compromises that made it possible to enact the 1991 version was an agreement not to
include the kind of explicit retroactivity command found in the 1990 bill.
The omission of the elaborate retroactivity provision of the 1990 bill... is not
dispositive because it does not tell us precisely where the compromise was struck in the
1991 Act.
Id. at256.
154 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (explaining why deletions of certain




authorizes punitive damages in certain circumstances.' 55 Because retroactive
application of punitive damages raises a constitutional question, the Court stated
that it would have to be confronted with a statute that explicitly authorized
punitive damages for pre-enactment conduct in order to rule on the issue, and
the Civil Rights Act contains no such explicit command. 156 Overcoming the
presumption against retroactivity is made more difficult when it would present
an ex post facto problem.' 57 If the Court had held that section 102 was to apply
retroactively, it would have had to address this constitutional question, violating
an additional axiom that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional
questions.' 58 In contrast, under CERCLA section 107(a), the damages
recoverable are not punitive, rather they are somewhat equitable in that they
provide for restitution of clean up costs from responsible parties. Thus, what
the Court in Landgraf found as additional evidence opposing retroactive
application of section 102 is absent from CERCLA's section 107(a).
Lastly, CERCLA is distinguishable from the statute at issue in Landgraf
because without a retroactive reading, CERCLA is rendered entirely
ineffective. Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act differs from section 107(a) of
CERCLA in that section 102 still operates just as effectively without a
retroactive reading.' 59 The Court acknowledged that retroactive application
may frequently vindicate a statute's purpose more fully, but that alone is not
enough to overcome the presumption against retroactive application. 160 A key
difference is that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was broad and expansive and
encompassed many aspects.' 6 ' However, CERCLA is unique in that it has a
155 See Landgrafi, 511 U.S. at 281.
156 See id.
157 See id. at 265-68. "It is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle
finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution. The Er Post Facto Clause flatly
prohibits retroactive application of penal legislation." Id. at 266 (citing U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 10, cI. 1).
158 See id. at 267 n.21. "In some cases, however, the interest in avoiding the
adjudication of constitutional questions will counsel against a retroactive application." Id.; see
also NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (declining to choose a
construction of an act that would require the resolution of difficult First Amendment
questions).
159 Section 102 provides for, inter alla, recovery for compensatory and punitive
damages for sexual harassment under Title VII. Without a retroactive reading, recovery of
compensatory and remedial damages for sexual harassment that occurred after section 102
was enacted is still allowed. "Section 102 is plainly not the sort of provision that must be
understood to operate retroactively because a contrary reading would render it ineffective."
Landgrafi, 511 U.S. at 286.
160 See id. at 285-86.
161 See id.
19981
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
more narrow focus-to clean up hazardous sites such as the popularly known
Love Canal. To achieve this purpose and provide money for clean up,
Congress enacted CERCLA.162 Congress also showed that CERCLA was
backward looking by enacting RCRA, which is forward looking, to continue
vigilant regulation of the disposal and treatment of hazardous substances. 163 In
light of the narrow purpose of CERCLA, and the fact that Congress enacted a
second forward or prospective looking statute, RCRA, it is clear that the
arguments supporting CERCLA's retroactive application overcome the
problems the Landgraf Court had in finding clear evidence of congressional
intent.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress did not expressly provide for CERCLA's temporal reach,
therefore the presumption against retroactive application of statutes must be
applied to CERCLA. To overcome this presumption, and thus apply CERCLA
retroactively, the Supreme Court in Landgraf instructs that there must be "clear
intent" by Congress to apply a statute retroactively. 164 CERCLA clearly
evidences the expression of congressional intent to overcome the presumption
against retroactivity. The intent of Congress is clear-polluters must pay. The
entire impetus for enacting CERCLA was to clean up such sites as Love Canal
and the Velsicol Chemical site.
Both prior and new rationales for supporting the retroactivity of CERCLA
prove that CERCLA overcomes the presumption against retroactive application
of statutes. There is ample evidence of congressional intent exhibited through
the use of past tense verbs in the statute, the legislative reports and numerous
debates, the overall scheme and spirit of the statute, the presence of RCRA in
the enforcement scheme, and congressional acquiescence. The claim that there
is insufficient congressional intent to overcome the presumption against
retroactivity was advanced in Olin. However, this decision fails to acknowledge
fully the scheme, purpose, and legislative history of CERCLA. Congress's
resonating intent in enacting CERCLA was to create a statutory mechanism to
exact responsibility upon those who were responsible for creating hazardous
sites, such as Love Canal and the Velsicol Chemical site.
162 See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
163 See id.
164 See supra Part II.B.
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